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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Mack Allen Player*
FoamVoRD
T HE fourth amendment to the Constitution has two basic clauses.'
The first, the reasonableness clause, protects the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The second, the warrant clause, sets
forth conditions under which a warrant may issue.2 Searches and sei-
zures made pursuant to a warrant are, quite obviously, governed by the
commands of the warrant clause. However, the effect of the warrant
clause upon searches and seizures made without warrants is not clear
from the amendment itself,3 and the Supreme Court has failed to
develop a consistent interpretation of the proper role of that clause.4
There are two theories about the proper relationship of the reason-
ableness and warrant clauses. The first reads the clauses as complements
to each other. Adherents of this theory discern an historical preference
for the warrant process, a desire to place a magistrate between the citi-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, on leave with the
US. Department of Labor. A.B., Drury College; J.D., University of MissourL The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. L. Penn Spell for his assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1 The full text of the amendment is as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or aflnation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US. CoNsr. amend. IV.
2 The warrant must be based upon oath or affirmation dearly stating facts indicating
"probable cause." Spinelli v. United States, 393 US. 410 (1968). See LaFave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 Irti LF. 255,
260-66. Further, the wan-ant must particularly describe the place to be searched. United
States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1959); People v. Reid, 315 Ill. 597, 146 N.E. 504
(1925). See Annot., 47 A.LR.2d 1444 (1956). It must also name the person or things to be
seized. Calo v. United States, 338 F.2d 793 (Ist Cir. 1964); Strauss v. Stynclicombe, 224
Ga. 859, 165 S.E2d 302 (1968).
3 The Fourth Amendment... consists of two conjunctive clauses .... But the Amend-
ment nowhere connects the two clauses; it nowhere sa)s in terms what one might ex-
pect it to say- that all searches without a wan-ant issued in compliance with the
conditions specified in the second clause are co ipso unreasonable under the first.
A.L.L & A.B.A., Trial Manual for Defense of Criminal Cases, Prelim. Draft 1, 28 (1966).
4 "The several cases on this subject in this Court cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. The
problem has, as is well-known, provoked strong and fluctuating differences of view on the
Court." Abel v. United States, 562 US. 217, 235 (1960). See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 US. 523, 528-29 (1967); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618, 622 (1961)
(Frankfurter concurring and Clark dissenting respectively).
[269]
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zen and the police. The argument is that the amendment was designed
to insulate the people from hastily conceived, unilateral police action.
This insulation is provided by the "neutral and detached magistrate."
Therefore, except in unusual or emergency situations when resort to
the judicial authority is impossible, searches and seizures without war-
rants must be considered unreasonable.5
The second theory of interpretation would treat the warrant and
reasonableness clauses as independent and severable. Adherents of this
theory argue that searches and seizures conducted without warrants
should be judged solely by the standard of reasonableness.0 Little or no
reference need to be made to the language of the warrant clause, and no
significance need be placed upon the failure to secure a warrant.7
5 An early advocate of this view was Mr. Justice Butler who stated: "Indeed, thc
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to
what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over
the hurried action of officers and others who happen to make arrests." United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
Later, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter declared, in no uncertain terms, that a warrant
was a necessary ingredient in the determination of reasonableness. Specifically, Mr. Justice
Jackson wrote:
[The Fourth Amendment's] protection consists in requiring that those inferences
[which can be drawn from the facts] be drawn from a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search, is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman ....
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Likewise, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in a dissenting opinion: "[W]ith minor and
severely confined exceptions, inferentially, a part of the [Fourth] Amendment, every
search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate's authority expressed
through a validly issued warrant." Harris v. United States, 831 U.. 145, 162 (1947). Dis-
senting again in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), Mr. Justice Frankfurter
stated: "[The warrant clause is] the key to what the framers had in mind by prohibiting
'unreasonable' searches and seizures. . . . [A)lU seizures without judicial authority were
deemed 'unreasonable.'" Id. at 605.
Some recent opinions by other members of the Court have also indicated a preference
for interpreting the warrant clause as complementary to the reasonableness clause. Sce
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Justice Stewart); McCray v. Illinois, 886
U.S. 300, 316 (1967) (Justice Douglas dissenting). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35
(1968) (dissenting opinion); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 5t8-29 (1967).
6 See Stoll, Warrantless Searches: A Proposal to End a Dilemma, 8 Ai. Cans. L.Q. 20
(1969).
7 Professor Telford Taylor has advocated this view and had marshaled considerable
historical support for his position. T. TAYLOR, Two Srunis IN CONSrrrUTIONAL INTERPRETA.
TioN 19-50 (1969). In Taylor's view, Justice Frankfurter and others who have read a
warrant requirement into the reasonableness clause have stood the amendment on Its head.
Professor Taylor points to the celebrated English General Warrant affairs of the mid-
18th Century concerning John Wilkes and John Entick and to the great controversy In our
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The court has failed to adopt one theory or the other to control all
areas of search and seizure. Indeed, it has displayed surprisingly little
consistency in its overall philosophy. In one instance the Court makes
bold statements indicating that police invasions without warrants are
prima facie unconstitutional. The next decision disclaims the impor-
tance of warrants and rules upon police conduct guided solely by the
flexible standard of reasonableness. Both theories have even been re-
flected in the language of a single decision.8
Although the overriding role to be played by the warrant clause in
warrantless searches and seizures is undefined, what is unclear and
contradictory as a generality takes on more consistent clarity when it
is broken down into distinct areas and analyzed one area at the time.
For the purposes of the following analysis the cases will be divided into
three categories. The first category contains cases where the sole ques-
tion involved is a seizure of the person, an arrest. The second category
is made up of cases where there is in issue only a search accomplished
without seizure of the person. The third category is comprised of cases
where an arrest and a search are combined, i.e. the search is alleged to
colonial history concerning the general Writs of Assistance. According to Taylor, "[O]ur
constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about over-
reaching warrants." Id. at 41. The colonists accepted as part of their heritage certain
warrantless searches, particularly those incidental to the arrest of suspected felons; it was
not these searches they feared. Their objective was to impose certain conditions upon the
issuance of warrants to insure "reasonableness." Hence, rather than reading the warrant
clause into the reasonableness clause, the founders intended to impose a standard of
reasonableness upon the issuing of a warrant.
The most notable case lending support to this position is United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), where the Court stated: "The relevant test is not whether It is reason-
able to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66. This
statement was quoted with approval in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), which
upheld the validity of a warrantless search of an automobile. The Court added, "It Is no
answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant ... "' Id. at 62.
Further, in Abel v. United States, 362 US. 217 (1960), the Court upheld the validity of a
warrantless search of a room pursuant to a deportation warrant and based its finding
solely upon the standard of "reasonableness."
Similarly, in Chimel v. California, $95 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court did not ue the
standard that a warrant could and thus should have been procured although it refused
to admit the fruits of the search. Rather, the Court viewed the constitutionality of the
search incidental to the arrest as a question of "reasonableness" and found the far.ranging
search of a home unreasonable.
8 In Terry v. Ohio, 892 US. 1 (1968), the Court found that "the central inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id. at 19. But later the Court
stated that "in most instances the failure to comply with the warrant requirement can
only be excused by exigent circumstances." Id. at 20.
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be incidental to the arrest. The most difficult problems of reconciling
the two fourth amendment clauses erupt in this third area.
AYURmT
Although not specifically set forth in the fourth amendment, the
word "arrest" has been defined as a "seizure of the person" and thus
found within the purview of the amendment.9 The Court has indicated
that the point of "seizure" is reached "[w]hen the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen.... ."10 Although the definition appears quite simple,
very difficult problems are encountered in determining exactly the
point at which liberty is restrained.11
9 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 US. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1 (1968). See also
Ker v. California, 374 US. 28 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 871 US. 471 (1963).
10 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. In earlier decisions the Supreme Court did not impose the fourth
amendment protections until a formal arrest had been consummated. E.g., Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 US. 98 (1959). Therefore, to de.
termine the point at which the constitutionality of conduct would be considered, lower
federal and state courts relied upon common law concepts and definitions of arrest.
Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966); Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1965); McChan v. State, 238 Md. 149, 207 A.2d 632 (1965). In some instances
"arrest" was interpreted to mean the actual or purported holding of a seized person to
answer a criminal charge. See, e.g., Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961);
2 W. BLACMSTONE, ComMENTAPSms 289 (3d ed. 1884); F. Fusnx, LAws oF Awuisr 7, 42 (1967);
RFSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 112 (1965); UNwos.m Apmzsr Aar § 1. Others advocated
the notion that there must be some belief on the part of the arrested person that he was
being held for criminal proceeding. See F. FisrER, supra at 52 (1967). Even the courts,
when ostensibly applying some common law concept of arrest, often added that pre-arrest
detention must be reasonable. Rodgers v. United States, supra; United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 82, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court attempted to
rectify this misinterpretation of the fourth amendment. For constitutional purposes only
the point of seizure was relevant.
11 This is illustrated by comparing Terry v. Ohio, 892 US. 1 (1968), and Peters v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), where the police ostensibly and physically curtailed the accused's
freedom of movement, with a companion case, Sibron v. New York, 892 US. 40 (1968),
where the liberty of the accused was restrained by a "show of authority" by the arresting
policeman. Although Sibron presented the opportunity to shed some light on this problem,
the Court assiduously avoided the question. However, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan proposed that the initial encounter between the policeman and the suspect re-
sulted in sufficient restraint to activate the provisions of the amendment. For further
illustration of this problem, compare Seals v. United States, 325 F.2d 1006 (D.C, Cir. 1963)
with United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961).
It is also interesting to note the similarity between the language in Terry, which de.
fined the point at which the protections of the fourth amendment must be reckoned
with, and the language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which specified the
juncture at which the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments are activated, i.e.
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Once it is accepted that a seizure has indeed taken place, the problem
becomes that of the proper standard to be applied to determine whether
the seizure was constitutionally justified. Conceivably a court could
measure all seizures of the person against the standard of their inherent
reasonableness with no reference to the warrant clause. However, the
Supreme Court has not done this in typical arrest situations (as dis-
tinguished from brief on-the-street encounters). Rather, in a limited
way it has read the reasonableness clause in conjunction with the war-
rant clause. It has ruled that warrants are the preferred method of
apprehension. If an officer secures a warrant, the fourth amendment's
warrant clause specifically requires that he demonstrate probable cause' 3
to the issuing magistrate.14 The Court reasons that if a lesser showing
than probable cause is permitted for seizures without warrants, then
resort to the "preferred" warrant process would be discouraged. 15 The
warrant clause standard of probable cause has thus influenced considera-
tions of what is reasonable.
No doubt the Court could have reached the same result without any
reference to the warrant clause. It could have held that probable cause
was the historical common law requirement for legal arrests10 and thus
pre-interrogation warnings as required when the accused is in "custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 US. at 478. It is con-
ceivable that Terry and Miranda might shed light on each other. However, it is likely
that Miranda requires not only a significant deprivation of freedom but also a "focusing"
on the accused. See 384 U.S. at 444 n.4; Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?":
California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L REv. 59 (1966).
12 Beck v. Ohio, 379 US. 89 (1964). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 US. 102
(1965).
13 "Probable cause" is an objective standard and is not measured by subjective good
faith or belief. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 857 U.S.
480 (1958). It exists when there are facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed and that the person named is
connected therewith. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Draper v. United
States, 358 US. 307 (1959); W. LAFAvE, ARxsr: Tun DEcTsoN TO TAE A SuspEcr mro
CuSrODY 244 (1965); 4 J. WHARToN, CpmmNAL LAw & PRocmEua, 243-44 (1957).
14 The fourth amendment provides in relevant part: "[N]o warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause ...." US. CoNsr. amend. IV.
15 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 US. 257
(1960); Johnson v. United States, 333 US. 10 (1948).
There is even considerable authority for the proposition that, properly to encourage use
of the "preferred" warrant, the standard for probable cause to justify unilateral police
action should be more stringent than the probable cause justifying the judicial issuance of
the warrant. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US. 108, 111 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 382
F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), reu'd, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
16 Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780); 2 IV. BLAsioze, supra note 10
at 292-93; 2 Hales P.C. 85-86.
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necessary for a "reasonable" seizure. It was merely a historical coinci-
dence that similar language appears in the warrant clause.17 In this way
the two clauses would have been viewed as entirely independent and
severable. Whatever might be the historical accuracy of such an ap-
proach, it is quite clear that the Court did not, in fact, interpret the
two clauses in this manner. The warrant clause itself was read to have
some relationship to "reasonableness" and because of this relationship
a similar standard was demanded for the two types of seizures.
Nevertheless, except for a brief glimmer found in the quickly over-
ruled Trupiano v. United States's and for hints in Beck v. Ohio,10 the
Court has given no positive indication that it intends to turn the pre-
ferred method of arrest into a required method. 20 The lower federal
courts have rejected the proposition that the fourth amendment re-
quires the securing of a warrant in order to make an arrest reasonable.
The test is probable cause not whether the officers could have secured a
warrant.21
When one considers the Court's position that most searches require
the prior authorization of a warrant, 22 its refusal to require an arrest
warrant when time permits seems quite incongruous. In an age when
the protection of personal liberty is thought to be more significant than
the protection of property interests, it is difficult to justify a distinction
which allows constitutional protections to the privacy of places but
17 At common law, arrests without warrants were substantially circumscribed. Howcver,
warrants, often creatures of non-judicial bodies, were occasionally issued on less stringent
standards and authorized sweeping invasions. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 23 ff. (1937); TAYLOR, supra note 7 at 24-27.
Therefore, it could be argued that the colonists accepted the fact that arrests without
warrants based upon probable cause were imminently reasonable. However, fearing the
general warrant based upon little or no showing of cause, he desired to see Imposed a
similar restriction upon the issuance of warrants. Thus, rather than the warrant clause
indirectly imposing a probable cause standard upon warrantless actions, the reverse was
true. The accepted probable cause standard for warrantless arrests found Its way Into the
warrant clause.
18 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
19 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
20 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967): Draper v. United States, 858 U.S. B07
(1959). This is not to say that there are not volumes of forceful statements Indicating the
need for warrants. See Jones v. United States, 362 US. 257, 270 (1960); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). But these
cases and others directed their attention to searches and not arrests.
21 United States v. Rubio, 404 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1968); Churder v. United States, 387
F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1968); Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469 (8th Cir, 1960), Rouse v.
United States, 359 F.2d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22 See text accompanying notes 31-36 infra.
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denies them to the liberty of persons. This incongruity is particularly
apparent when the highly protected right of privacy itself is circum-
vented. It should be patently unreasonable to permit the police to
invade without judicial authorization the private premises of the ac-
cused for the purpose of making an arrest and then permit them while
there to seize objects and to conduct searches as incidents to the arrest.P
Such a practice endangers privacy as well as liberty. Therefore, even if
public arrests without warrants can be sanctioned, it would seem that
invasions of private areas to search for persons should receive no less
protection than invasions to search for physical objects.24
The Supreme Court recently recognized an exception to the probable
cause standard for warrantless seizures of the person. In Terry v. Ohio25
the Court determined that, when police conduct an on-the-street en-
counter and superficial search for weapons, the fourth amendment,
though applicable to the seizure, required neither adherence to the
warrant process nor the presence of probable cause. The validity of a
seizure in such a "stop and frisk" is determined solely by the reasonable-
ness of the police conduct. Thus, in this limited situation the Court
gave complete independence and preeminence to the reasonableness
clause and completely ignored the presence and language of the warrant
clause.
The method by which the Court has handled the "stop and frisk"
problem necessarily leads to a difficult subsidiary problem that could
have been avoided. The Court seems to view the concept of "reasonable-
ness" and "probable cause" as independent and irreconcilable. "Prob-
able cause" is viewed as a more or less static and constant standard,
23 See Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Sprovieri, 95 IM.
App. 2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1968). A similar but distinguishable problem is presented
when officers in executing a search warrant describing the objects to be seized come upon
additional fruits, evidences, or contraband. Can these undescribed items be seized? Com-
pare Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961) and United States v. Alloway,
397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968) (yes) with People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 807, 244 N.E.2d, 232
(1968) (no).
24 After noting that the question was not before the Court, Justice Harlan in Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958), stated that "whether the forceful nighttime entry into
a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within, upon probable cause that he
had committed a felony, under circumstances where no reason appears why an arrest
warrant could not have been sought [raises a grave constitutional question]." 357 U.S. at
499-500. In Dorman v. United States, No. 21,736 (D.C. Cir. April 15, 1970) (en banc). the
Court held that invasions of the home for the purpose of making an arrest must. when
possible, be based upon an arrest warrant. In this case, however, the court found exigent
circumstances that excused resort to the warrant process.
25 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1971]
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while "reasonableness" is recognized as highly flexible. The Court has
thus held that when the "seizure" is an "arrest" the fixed standard of
probable cause must be applied. However, when the "seizure" is only
a "stop" the flexible standard of reasonableness may be used. The Court
will necessarily be forced to draw a line between the "stop" and the
"arrest" in order to determine which standard to apply.20 To draw this
line the Court may well resort to the difficult common law determina-
tions of when the arrest takes place.27
The Court could have avoided this problem by either abandoning
probable cause as a constitutional imperative for public seizures or by
requiring probable cause for all seizures but defining probable cause in
flexible rather than fixed terms. The idea of a flexible probable cause
standard was perhaps first and best expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson.28
The idea has been recognized by writers2 9 and has received some ac-
26 This problem is highlighted by Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 791 (1969), and
Morales v. NeW York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969). In Davis a seizure of individuals for investiga-
tion and fingerprinting was held to be a violation of fourth amendment rights. However,
tile Court left the door open to the possibility that certain seizures of persons might be
permitted "under narrowly defined circumstances" even though no probable cause existed.
These narrowly defined circumstances were not present in Morales. There the accused
was seized and detained thirty minutes for police interrogation. The state court held that,
although probable cause did not exist, the seizure was nevertheless reasonable when one
balanced the difficulty of apprehension and the seriousness of the crime against invasion
of individual freedom. See People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S2d
898 (1968). In vacating the judgment the Supreme Court stated: "The ruling below, that
the State may detain for custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a traditional
arrest... goes beyond our subsequent decisions ...." 396 US. at 104-05.
27 See note 10 supra. In fact there may have been very little change of the law as the
result of Terry because many courts already recognized that the pre-arrest seizures had to
be reasonable. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966).
28 If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a road-
block about the neighborhood and search every out-going car, it would be a drastic and
undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable
cause for searching any particular car. However, I would candidly strive hard to
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reason.
able to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened
life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock
and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (dissent).
29 The traditional expression "probable cause" like "reasonable suspicion" and "beyond
reasonable doubt" has been used as a label for the quantum of evidence necessary to
justify a particular level of intrusion on personal privacy in the criminal law area;
but it would be perfectly rational, although unusual, to speak of "probable cause to
stop" and "probable cause to imprison" as well as "probable cause to arrest." In each
case the reasonableness and thus constitutionality of the [seizure] would depend on
the interrelation between the amount of evidence, the justification for the [seizure]
and the scope and manner of the [seizure].
Note, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 439 n.28 (1969). See also RESrATEMENT OF TORTS § 119 Comment j
(1934).
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ceptance by the courts30 In taking this approach the courts would
require a showing of probable cause before any and all seizures. How-
ever, to determine whether probable cause existed many factors would
be taken into account including the seriousness of the offense, the abso-
lute need to conduct this type of investigation, the nature of the locale,
activities of the suspect, the danger to the public if immediate action is
not taken, the nature and length of detection, and the harm to the sus-
pect. In reality there is little difference between this approach to prob-
able cause and that which views all seizures solely by their reasonableness.
However, abandonment of the concept of probable cause would mean
overruling precedent that predates our Constitution. Such a course
would probably be unacceptable to the Court. However, adoption of a
flexible standard of probable cause would achieve the same result but
in an acceptable way. Certainly such an approach to public seizures of
persons would give the police and lower courts a guide preferable to
that which first requires them to distinguish betaween "stops" and "ar-
rests" and then directs them to application of "reasonableness" or
"probable cause."
SEARCH
When the problem of a search is in issue, the interrelationship
between the reasonableness and warrant clauses is quite apparent. In
this class of cases, a warrant is not veiwed as a mere preference but, with
some exceptions, 31 is looked upon as a condition precedent to a consti-
tutional search.
30 In United States v. Kancso, 252 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1958). the court stated: 'The word
.reasonable' is not to be construed in abstract or in a vacuum unrelated to the field to
which it applies. Standards which might be reasonable for the apprehension of bank-
robbers might not be reasonable for the arrest of narcotics peddlers." Id. at 222.
In Camara v. Munidpal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court, in fact, applied this
flexible analysis to administrative searches. The Court held that warrants should be
secured before normal inspections. However, the Court recognized the problem of effective
enforcement of administrative regulations if probable cause in a static form could be
demanded. In recognition of this particular need the Court indicated that probable
cause standards for the warrant could be judged flexibly to meet the needs of this area of
regulation. The right of privacy was to be weighed against the need for governmental
intrusion. It was this flexible approach to probable cause that prompted Justice Harlan's
dissent.
31 See Schmerber v. California, 384 US. 757 (1966) (warrantless seizures of blood sample
from defendant's arm justified by fact that delay would result in destruction of the cvi-
dence); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (recognized exception but found
it not present in the facts); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182 (1925) (need for im-
mediate action because of mobility of the object, a car, to be searched); Hernandez v.
United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966) (need to search luggage checked for an out-
bound airplane flight). The doctrine of "hot pursuit" is also a branch of the exigent
1971]
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Again the Court could logically have viewed all searches on the
basis of reasonableness.32 Unless the search is made pursuant to a
warrant, no reference necessarily need be made to the warrant clause.83
Again, however, the Court has not taken this approach. "[E]xcept in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a
valid search warrant."3 4 Unlike arrests which may be made upon prob-
able cause without any necessity of securing a warrant,85 searches
may not be made solely upon a showing of probable cause.80 As pointed
out above this distinction between arrests and searches is difficult to
rationalize.
SEARCHES INCIDENTAL TO A RESTS
The most widely recognized exception to the search warrant require-
ment is the category comprised of searches conducted incidental to a
lawful arrest. Arrests are measured against the standard of reasonable-
ness as influenced by the concept of probable cause; searches are mea-
sured against the standard of the warrant process. When an arrest and
a search are interrelated, the problem arises as to which analysis should
be applied. This problem appears throughout the development of the
law in this area.
The common law accepted warrantless searches of the person when
they were incidents to lawful arrests.3 7 Early Supreme Court dicta
indicated that a warrant is normally required for a constitutional
search but that an exception is to be made when a search of a person
is made at the time of his lawful arrest.38 These dicta were soon a
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). Finally, the widely-recognized power of the police to search as an Incident to a
lawful arrest, though widely employed, must be viewed as an exception to the rule re-
quiring warrants. It is only the immediate need of the police to search for weapons that
might be used against them and for evidence that might be destroyed that justifies the
search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
32 See Stoll, supra note 6.
83 See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 23 ff.
84 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US. 523, 528-29 (1967).
85 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 US. 300 (1967); Draper v. United States, 858 U.S. 807
(1959); Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1966).
86 "Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling
house furnishes no justification whatever for a search of that place without a warrant."
Agnello v. United States, 269 US. 20, 33 (1925).
87 "There is little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee's person and premises Is
as old as the institution of arrest itself." T. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 28. Se E:x parte Hum,
92 Ala. 102, 9 So. 515 (1891); People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
a8 In Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914), the Court stated: "[T]he right ... to
[Vol. 5:269
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part of the constitutional folldore The notion is now firmly em-
bedded in the terminology of criminal law.40
Accordingly we have both a rule which requires a warrant and an
exception which allows warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest.
The exception has the potential for overwhelming the rule. Warrants
are not currently demanded for legal arrests, and searches that are
incidents to the arrests are permitted even absent a warrant. Assuming
that prior judicial authorization for searches is a goal, steps must be
taken to insure that the "incident" exception does not strangle the rule.
There are two methods by which the exception might be kept in
bounds and the warrant process preserved as a viable check on police
intrusions. The first method would be to apply the warrant clause as it is
normally applied to seizures. Unless excused by exigent circumstances,
any search beyond the person of the arrested party, must be authorized
by a warrant if it is to be found reasonable. A second method would be
to place a strict interpretation upon the word "incident." Incidental
searches without warrants would be permitted, but their scope would
be sharply circumscribed by "reasonableness." Unless one of these two
approaches is taken, the warrant rule vill be strangled by its exception.
In 1925 the Supreme Court established that "[t]he search of a private
dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorent to
our laws."4' However, two years later in Marron v. United States,2 the
Court sustained a seizure of liquor and account books which were
found in a room other than the one in which the arrest took place. The
Court stated that the police "had a right without a warrant contempo-
raneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used
to carry on the criminal enterprise... .The authority of officers to
search and seize the things by which the nuisance was being maintained
extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose." 43
The implications of this holding certainly threatened the newly estab-
search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or
evidence of the crime... has been uniformly maintained in many cases." 232 US. at 892.
89 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 US. 344, 358 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 US. 192, 198 (1927);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 40 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 158
(1925).
40 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1959); R. Cws, CmirNAL DuE.m "'cn: zQurs
§ 408 (1969); L. HALL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROcEDURE 270 (1968); D. NEiw, Tim St um
CouRT AND THE LAW OF CRIMNAL INVESTIGATION 49 (1969); HAaDoox O.N CuRI.AL
PoCeuE iN TBE UNrED STATES Disnuar COURT § 102 (1967).
41 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
42 275 US. 192 (1927).
48 Id. at 199.
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lished warrant rule. In the early 1930s, the Supreme Court stemmed any
wave of broad contemporaneous searches that could have flowed from
the 1927 Marron decision.44 First in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States45 and then in United States v. Lefkowitz, 40 the Court struck down
broad searches that the government sought to characterize as incidents
to legal arrests. In so doing, however, the Court failed to adopt any
dear analysis of the role to be played by the two clauses of the fourth
amendment.47 The lack of clarity in the Court's analysis confused the
lower federal courts, 4s and the want of guidance left them floundering.40
An opportunity for clarity was presented in Harris v. United States.50
44 The lower courts, however, did not seem to be allowing unduly broad incident
searches under the authority of Marron. See Day v. United States, 87 F.2d 80 (8th Cir.
1929); United States v. Solomon, 33 F.2d 193 (D. Mass. 1929); Benton v. United States, 28
F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1928).
45 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
46 285 US. 452 (1932).
47 In Go-Bart the Court made reference to the importance of the warrant process in
protecting individual liberties. The Court then noted how the officers had an abundance of
information and time to swear out a valid warrant. However, the Court went on to
indicate that the test to be applied was that of reasonableness. Although no question was
raised as to the search of the person, the thorough search of the office in which the person
was arrested was characterized as a "lawless invasion of the premises and a general ex.
ploratory search in the hope that evidence of crime might be found." 282 U.S. at 858.
Lefkowitz also contains language and analysis indicating that searches conducted at the
time of arrests must be viewed in terms of reasonableness. However, even more than in
Go-Bart, the Court made extensive reference to the value and need for search warrants.
See 285 U.S. at 464.
To complicate the analysis further, Lefkowitz relied heavily upon the Gouled mere
evidence rule. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The case and rule were
subsequently overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 887 U.S. 294 (1967). Gouled allowed war-
rants to issue only when the search was for contraband or the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime. Warrants to search for "mere evidence" were held to violate the fourth and
fifth amendments. In Lejkowitz the Court recognized that the search that was conducted
contemporaneous with the arrest was for mere evidence. Since a warrant could not issue
for this search, the Court was not constrained to allow a warrantless search.
48 For such an expression thereof, see United States v. Thomson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th
Cir. 1940).
49 A number of cases seemed to focus on the motive for the search. If it appeared that
the search was conducted for the purpose of securing evidence, the search was struck down
as exploratory. In re Ginsburg, 147 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1945); Hershkowitz v. United States,
65 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870
(W.D.N.Y. 1943). Some cases seemed to read a warrant requirement into the concept of
reasonableness. Brown v. United States, 83 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1936); Milborne v. United
States, 77 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935); United States v. 1018 Crates, 52 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1931).
Searches as an incident to the arrest were accepted without a warrant, but what was
considered an incident varied considerably. Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557
(6th Cir. 1948); Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 193); Martin v. United
States, 62 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1932).
50 381 US. 145 (1947).
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On the basis of an arrest warrant charging mail fraud, the defendant
was arrested in the living room of his four-room apartment. Without a
search warrant the officers conducted an extensive five-hour search of
the entire apartment. In the defendant's desk the officers unearthed a
sealed envelope containing altered draft cards. These were used against
defendant in a prosecution under the selective service laws.
The Court did not raise any question about whether the officers had
time to secure a warrant. It looked solely at the reasonableness of the
search. Although the opportunity to define the limits of incidental
searches was presented, the Court added nothing to the existing analysis.
It merely repeated a statement from Go-Bart: "The test of reasonable-
ness cannot be stated in rigid absolute terms. Each case is to be decided
on its own facts and circumstances." 51 The value of this case as prece-
dent rests not upon what little the Court said but upon the implications
of its holding. The search had ranged through the defendant's entire
dwelling. The Court placed no apparent importance upon the size of
the dwelling. It noted that "[t]he area which reasonably may be sub-
jected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous circumstance
that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to some other
room of the apartment."5 2 Without stating what was reasonable, the
Court indicated that a search would be permitted as an incident to an
arrest if it were made in an area over which the arrested person exer-
cised "control." Significantly, it did not modify the word "control" with
the word "immediate" as it had done in the earlier case of Marron v.
United States.53 Noteworthy too is the fact that the Court cited and
relied upon circuit court opinions which had sanctioned sweeping
incidental searches.54 Quite dearly the Court was interpreting the
reasonableness clause to permit very broad searches as incidents of
lawful arrests.55
With this sweeping interpretation given "incident" one of the two
potential blocks against virtually unrestrained avoidance of the warrant
51 Id. at 150.
52 Id. at 152.
53 275 US. 192 (1927).
54 Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943), and Parks v. United States, 76 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1935), approved searches of an entire home pursuant to a lawful arrest in
the home. United States v. 71.A Ounces Gold, 94 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1938), upheld the in-
cidental search of a multi-room business premise.
55 Furthermore, unlike Lefkowitz which condemned as "exploratory" a thorough search
of files and a wall safe, the Court in Harris did not seem concerned with the thoroughness
of the search of defendant's apartment. Five hours of rummaging through the personal
papers of defendant was accepted as "reasonable."
HeinOnline  -- 5 Ga. L. Rev.  281 1970-1971
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
process was removed. However, the position of the Court on the second
block upholding the warrant requirement was still unsettled. There was
the fifteen-year-old dictum in Lefkowitz and Go-Bart indicating that
the ability of the police to secure a search warrant was a factor in
determining the reasonableness of searches made pursuant to arrests.
Though a few lower courts had applied this dictum,10 it had not been
significantly reasserted by the Court nor widely accepted by the lower
courts.5 7
Now that incidental searches had a virtual free reign, the warrant
process for searches was in danger of complete erosion. If police were
not required to secure a warrant when time permitted, there would be
little impetus to utilize the warrant process at any time. Instead of
searches requiring a warrant except when made as incidents of lawful
arrests, the rule was in danger of reading: "searches may be made
without warrants except when no one on the premises has been ar-
rested."58
Such was the setting when, a year later in Trupiano v. United States,0
the Court was called upon to consider a search that, though far reach-
ing, was clearly an "incident" to a lawful arrest under the Harris defini-
don. The police had sufficient time to secure a warrant but had failed
to do so. The Court ruled that the search and seizure was a violation
of the fourth amendment. Rather than attacking Harris and holding
that the search was not an incident, the Court asserted the rule requir-
ing searches to be authorized by a magistrate unless resort to that process
was made impossible by the circumstances.00 Since the holding in Harris
remained good law, the two cases, Harris and Trupiano, had to be read
together, as complements to each other. If there was no opportunity to
secure a search warrant in the advance of police action a warrantless
search as an incident to the arrest would be permitted. "Incident" as
defined by Harris permitted intensive and far ranging inspections of
premises. Trupiano indicated, however, that if opportunity in advance
of the arrest permitted the securing of a search warrant, a far ranging
"incidental" search would not be considered reasonable. The warrant
56 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 83 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1936); United States v. 1013
Crates, 52 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1931).
57 See, e.g., Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Martin v. United States,
62 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1932).
58 See T. TAYLOR, supra note 7.
59 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
00 Heavy reliance was placed upon dicta from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), and Leflowitz.
[Vol. 5:269
HeinOnline  -- 5 Ga. L. Rev.  282 1970-1971
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
clause was thus playing an important role in the determination of
reasonableness. Here was a code of relatively simple application that the
lower courts had no apparent difficulty in applying.0'
Harris and Trupiano did leave problems, 2 but they had no time to
be resolved. Two years after its birth Trupiano was overruled by
United States v. Rabinowitz.63 Rabinowitz was the culmination of a
struggle between philosophies about the proper relationship between
the two clauses of the fourth amendment. 4 With this decision the
reasonableness clause was given the center of the stage, and the influ-
1 United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1950); United States v. O'Brien,
174 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1949); Cradle v. United States, 178 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
62 Assume, for instance, that the police had time to secure a search warrant yet failed to
do so. Assume they made a legal arrest. Could they, pursuant to this arrest, search the
person of the arrested party? If the holding in Trupiano were read literally such a search
could be considered "unreasonable" because time permitted the securing of a search
warrant. However, it is doubtful that the Court intended to overrule the established
common law power of the policeman to protect himself when making a lawful arrest by
searching the person of the arrestee. See United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341 (7th Cr.
1949). Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which overruled Trupiano, seemed
to assume this interpretation. Broad incidental searches would not be accepted when time
permitted the securing of a warrant. But the common law "incident" search of the person
might be considered reasonable in the absence of a warrant.
A second unanswered problem would be presented when the police did not have time to
secure a search wan-ant in advance of their arrest. After the arrest, must they secure a
warrant before proceeding with a search of the premises? The answer would seem to be
no. The warrant requirement in Trupiano appeared to relate only to pre-arrcst process.
63 339 US. 56 (1950).
64 In a 5 to 4 decision with Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy and Rutledge dis-
senting, Harris gave force to the reasonableness clause by expanding the concept of "in-
cidental" to include what was reasonable. One year later Mr. Justice Douglas changed
sides to join the Harris dissenters, and this five man majority in Trupiano required a
warrant for the Harris type of "incidental" search. During the next two years two mem-
bers of the Court who favored the warrant process, Justices Rutledge and Murphy, were
replaced. Only Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Douglas remained from the Trupiano
majority. The new members of the Court, Justices Minton and Clark, sided with the
Trupiano dissent. It was under Mr. Justice Minton's authorship that Rabinowitz over-
ruled Trupiano.
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of the
people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant
if it is practicable for the officers to secure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amend-
ment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches. It is not
disputed that there may be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest, without a search
warrant. Upon acceptance of this established rule that some authority to search
follows from lawfully taking the person into custody, it becomes apparent that such
searches turn upon the reasonableness under all the circumstances and not upon the
practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not required. ... The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search wrarrant, but whether
the search was reasonable.
389 U.. 56, 65-66 (1950).
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ence of the warrant clause upon searches incidental to arrests was
rendered largely nugatory.
The facts of Rabinowitz are surprisingly similar to Lefkowitz. Armed
with an arrest warrant the police seized Rabinowitz in his one-room
office. Although there was sufficient time to secure a search warrant, the
police neglected to do so. The office was thoroughly searched and
incriminating evidence seized. On the basis of Trupiano the circuit
court reversed the trial court's acceptance of the search. The Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court and overruled Trupiano. The majority
of the Court was not impressed with the argument that the warrant
clause should be read into the concept of reasonableness.6 5 The Court
relied upon the reasonableness language found in Go-Bart and Lefko-
witz. However, these cases, on similar facts, struck down the searches
and stood for the limitation upon the power to search.
Rabinowitz had the potential for limited application. First, it dealt
with the search of a one-room business office that was open to the public.
Second, the Court repeatedly qualified the "control" language found in
Harris by adding the modifier "immediate."0 0 These factors were listed
as making this search reasonable. Although the Court did lay the
groundwork for a future restriction on the scope of warrantless searches,
no further work was done. Until the recent case of Chimel v. Cali.
fornia,17 the Court made only a few efforts to limit the application of
the Rabinowitz holding.68
In brief, the combination was no longer Harris-Trupiano. It was
Harris-Rabinowitz. Rabinowitz stood for the proposition that a search
as an incident to a lawful arrest would be considered reasonable even
in the absence of a search warrant. Harris stood for the proposition
that incidental searches could be broadly interpreted to include entire
buildings. The lower courts took their cue and generally sanctioned
extensive and far-reaching incidental searches. 09
65 Id.
60 The Court readopted the modifier used in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927), but dropped from the decision in Harris.
67 595 US. 752 (1969).
(8 In James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965), the Court reiterated the established
proposition: "A search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially con-
temporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest." 382
U.S. at 37. An arrest outside a structure would not be grounds for a search within the
structure.
69 Numerous incidents of searching entire dwellings, even multi-floor dwellings, were
284
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The overturning of Trupiano removed the second and final barrier
to the widespread avoidance of the warrant process. Harris' broad
interpretation of "incident" lowered one barrier. The second barrier
came down when far-ranging incidental searches were permitted with-
out a warrant. Now the police could conduct most of the searches they
needed simply by making a lawful arrest. Seldom would there be a need
to resort to the warrant process.7 0 In fact use of a warrant presented
certain hazards. If all the technical requirements of the warrant were
not met, the evidence that was seized thereunder would not be admissi-
ble. There would be no such risks with the incidental search. Therefore,
only if there was no one on the premises who could be legally arrested
or who could give consent to the search would the police need to secure
magisterial authorization. As a result the warrant process was largely
dead. =
If one starts with the proposition that the warrant process is a valu-
able protection to individual privacy, he could not but mourn the
virtual destruction of that process. If one accepts the many pronounce-
ments from the Court that the warrant is the "preferred" method of
procedure, he could only be mystified by the logic that complete and
undisguised avoidance of that process is not in some way unreasonable
as well as undesirable. It is an interesting application of policy to
establish a rule which says searches must be authorized by a warrant
sustained. Harris and Rabinowitz were cited as parallel authority. Robinson v. United
States, 327 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1964) (Blaclmun, J.); Collins v. Klinger, 322 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.
1964); Townsend v. United States, 271 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 254
F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Even searches outside of the dwelling were sustained as In-
cidental to the arrest that took place in the dwelling. Gentry v. United States, 268 F.2d
63 (4th Cir. 1959); People v. Braden, 34 I1l.2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966).
A few courts did place a more restrictive meaning on Rabinowitz., and thus a few in-
stances of courts condemning searches as "exploratory" can be found. United States v.
Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. DeL 1962); United States v. Lemer, 100 F. Supp. 765 (NJ).
Cal. 1951).
To The potential for abusive searches was accelerated by the demise of the mere
evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). While it existed, the rule per-
haps had some prophylactic effect on police and judidal practices. Theoretically, searches
for evidence, as distinguished from fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband, were uncon-
stitutional. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 US. 452 (1932); United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y. 1943). In practice, however, the courts avoided
the effect of the rule by labeling virtually all evidence as either "fruits" or "instrumental-
ity." See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D. C. Cir. 1958); State v. Chinn
231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962).
71 "Less than 150 search warrants will be issued in a major city, such as Detroit, during
an entire year." L. HALL, supra note 40, at 8. See L. TiFFM'Y, D. MCI.Nn.E & D. Rorm-
BEmG, DLrCTON oF CRmx 100-05 (1967) for similar statistics.
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but then create an exception that completely destroys the rule. But that
is what the Court did.
Not only were the results of these cases open to logical and philosoph-
ical criticism, they created a train of difficult problems. Distinguishing
between incidental and non-incidental exploratory searches gave the
lower courts a difficult guide to follow.7 2 Furthermore, as the ability to
make a warrantless search of the premises depended upon an arrest
being made thereon,73 it became important to time the arrest to take
place inside the premises. Likewise, an arrest on "technical" charges
could be used as a pretext for a general search. These timed74 and
pretext 5 arrests were not allowed to serve as a basis for an incidental
search. Nonetheless, the determination of whether an arrest was timed
or was a pretext was a difficult factual problem.
With Chimel v. California8 the Court accepted the opportunity to
reevaluate its position an incidental searches. In Chimel incriminating
evidence was seized in a search of petitioner's home and curtilage. No
search warrant had been obtained although police had had adequate
time to secure one.7 7 The state attempted to justify the search on the
grounds that petitioner was legally arrested in his home.
If the Court desired to place a curb on free-wheeling incidental
searches it could take either of two courses of action. It could revive the
Trupiano ruling that all broadly defined incidental searches must be
justified by a warrant and thereby emphasize the role of the warrant
clause. Or the court could attack the Harris definition of "incident" and
accomplish reform via the reasonableness clause. Either approach would
revive the lost art of applying for search warrants. The choice could
72 See Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). As pointed out by Professor LaFave,
the terms "immediate control" and "immediate presence" are ambiguous. They can mean
essentially what the reader desires. LaFave, supra note 2, at 285-86.
78 James v. Louisiana, 382 US. 36 (1965).
74 Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (Ist Cir. 1968); United States v. James, 878 F.2d
88 (6th Cir. 1967).
75 Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1968); Handley v. State,
480 P.2d 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). Cf. Abel v. United States, 862 U.S. 217 (1960) (de-
portation arrest dearly used as pretext to search apartment for evidence of espionage).
See also Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Anderson v. State, 444 P.2d
289 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
70 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
77 The police had obtained an arrest warrant which was declared Invalid. Nonetheless,
the Court assumed on the basis of existing probable cause that the arrest was valid. If
the police got an arrest warrant they must have had an opportunity to secure a search
warrant.
[Vol. 5:269
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play an important role in the further development of the law. The
second alternative was elected.
In Chimel the Court declared the warrantless search of petitioner's
home and environs to be a violation of the fourth amendment. Refusing
to be satisfied by distinguishing the facts,78 the court attacked the
Harris interpretation of the point at which a search was incidental to
an arrest. Thus the Court elected to base its decision upon a reinterpre-
tation of the reasonableness clause as opposed to the imposition of a
warrant requirement. The Court stated that a warrantless search may
be conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest only when the search is
confined to the person arrested and confined to an "area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him."'70 Searches beyond this limited
area fall outside the "incident" exception and within the general rule
that requires the securing of a warrant. Thus, the complete search of
Chimel's home was "unreasonable."
While Chimel's attack was directed at Harris it certainly breathed
new life into Trupiano. For, as in Trupiano, if the search ranges far
beyond the person arrested a warrant will be necessary. However, a
theoretical difference exists. Tnspiano was founded upon the warrant
clause's imposition upon the reasonableness clause. Chimel, however,
is founded upon a redefinition of the exception to the warrant require-
ment. This difference in theories could be telling.
Assume, for example, that there is need for prompt police action
in making an arrest. There is no time prior to the arrest to resort
to magisterial authorization. Assume further that the police recognize
a need to search beyond the person of the arrestee after the arrest. On
its surface Chimel would seem to require a warrant before the police
could proceed. The search can no longer be justified under the "inci-
dent" exception and no other exception would seem to justify avoid-
ance of the warrant requirement. However, assume in addition that the
unique facts of the case prevent the officers from securing a warrant
without risking loss of the evidence believed to be present. The ar-
resting officer might be alone, and, if he leaves, unarrested confederates
78 Harris involved the search of a four-room apartment. Rabinowitz with its theoreti-
cally limiting language involved the search of a single.room business office. Chimel,
however, had to rule upon the search of the entire house including attic as well as garage
and workshop.
79 395 US. at 768.
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might destroy any secreted evidence or contraband. The problem is:
can the officer stay and make the needed search without a warrant?
The answer under the Harris-Trupiano theory would seem to be
clear. 0 If there was no time to secure a search warrant before the police
made their initial move to arrest, no warrant was demanded. Once the
arrest was made, an extensive search could be conducted as an incident
to that arrest because "incident to the arrest" as defined by Harris could
be a far-reaching affair. Only if there was time in advance of the arrest
to secure a search warrant did Trupiano demand a warrant.81
However, applying Chimel to the hypothetical, the result would be
far from clear. Chimel, unlike Trupiano, did not demand that a search
warrant be obtained if time permitted. Nor did it excuse it if circum-
stances prohibited. The Court only said that the Harris definition of
"incident to an arrest" was too broad. Thus, even though the police
had no opportunity to secure a search warrant in advance of the arrest,
a complete search of the premises cannot now be justified as an incident
of the arrest. Such incidental searches are now limited to the person
and that area within his reach. Therefore, to justify the warrantless
search beyond this area, as the above hypothetical would require, an
exception must be found other than the arrest exception. Perhaps the
doctrine of emergency or exigent circumstances could be applied to
this particular situation.82 If evidence is in danger of destruction,
certainly this is an emergency that would justify a warrantless search.
An alternative solution to the problem could come by adapting a
closely-related branch of the exigent circumstances concept-"hot
pursuit." The "hot pursuit" exception was espoused and relied upon
in the recent case of Warden v. Hayden83 in which the police were
80 Trupiano did not have sufficient longevity to have this particular point actually
ruled upon.
81 This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the thrust of Trupiano was directed to
the time the officers had to secure a warrant before they moved in to make the arrests. In
Harris it is unclear what opportunity the officers had to secure a warrant prior to the
arrest. However, they could have secured a warrant after the arrest but before the search,
but they failed to do so. Hence, Trupiano did not overrule Harris. The majority ap-
parently accepted the fact that in Harris there was no time in advance of the arrest to
secure the warrant and that after the arrest there was no constitutional obligation to
secure one. If the Court in Trupiano had been concerned with securing a warrant after
the arrest presumably it would have directed its wrath to that aspect of Harris and so
overruled it.
82 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (potential destruction of blood-alcohol
evidence by bodily functions); Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132 (1925) (potential
movement of evidence believed to be in an automobile).
88 587 U.S. 294 (1967).
[Vol. 5:269
HeinOnline  -- 5 Ga. L. Rev.  288 1970-1971
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
informed of a robbery and were told that a suspect had entered a
particular dwelling some five minutes earlier. The police entered and
spread throughout the house. They searched under mattresses, in bu-
reau drawers, and even in the washing machine and toilet tank. Evidence
from basement to second story was seized and introduced against the
defendant who was arrested inside the structure. The Court assiduously
avoided classifying this search as one incident to the arrest. The seizure
was held to be a proper part of the pursuit of the suspect and the search
for weapons. Had the Court based its decision upon the search as inci-
dental to the arrest, which it could have done given the state of the law
at that time, 4 quite dearly that decision would have been overruled
by the later Chimel decision. 5 Given their close proximity in time and
the careful avoidance of arrest justification in Warden v. Hayden, the
two decisions should not be viewed as inconsistent. They are better
viewed as complementary, to be used together in solving the problems
presented when the police need to search but have had no opportunity
in advance of their arrest to secure a search warrant.
The doctrine of "hot pursuit" as applied in Warden v. Hayden could
be given a somewhat expansive interpretation. "Hot pursuit" could be
found in any situation where anticipated apprehension of a suspect was
such that resort to the warrant process would be a practical impossi-
bility. Such a situation would be present when the police observed a
crime or received information which made prompt action imperative,
and, under the holding of Warden v. Hayden, a search of the premises
could be made without the necessity of a warrant.80 However, when the
nature of the arrest is such that the police have the opportunity to
secure a search warrant before they act, as was the case in Chimel, the
84 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56 (1950).
85 Perhaps the Court, when it decided Warden v. Hayden, was looking ahead to the
facts found in Chimel.
s6 In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.. 557,
570-72 (1969), there is an indication that a search otherwise lawful might be limited in
its thoroughness. The discovery of a reel of movie film while executing a search warrant
describing gambling paraphernalia did not justify a warrantless investigation of the film.
Thus, a superficial search for the suspect and weapons and the seizure of obvious evi-
dence that is in plain sight might be permissible under "hot pursuit." On the other hand,
a thorough investigation of hidden and private places that have no relationship to the
seeking of a suspect or weapons might be considered beyond the scope of the privilege.
However, it must be noted that, in Warden v. Hayden, the Court sanctioned the seizure of
evidence from places where the defendant could not possibly have been hiding. Given the
facts of that case it is highly unlikely that any weapons located therein could have beea
used against the police. Thus, an extremely thorough search was permitted.
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police will be limited in their warrantless search to the person and the
area immediately within his reach.
The hypothetical situation posed above would easily be solved by
such an interpretation of the two cases. Because the police had no
opportunity to secure a warrant in advance of their arrest, their actions
would not be governed by the limitations of Chimel. Rather the "hot
pursuit" doctrine would be applicable and would permit a reasonable
search of the premises as part of the pursuit.8 7 Thus the analysis and
result would be the same under the short lived Harris-Trupiano rule.
In light of Chimel the Court may be unwilling to allow a broad inci-
dental search solely because police had no time before the arrest to
secure a warrant. Hopefully, however, they will view such searches as
"reasonable." The determination of constitutional "reasonableness"
is governed by balancing the underlying social policies against the
need of the government to gather information.88 There is a strong
social policy behind the demand that, whenever possible, the police
must secure warrants before initiating intrusions. This policy justifies
excluding evidence when the demand is not met. However, the social
policy behind the securing of warrants after a valid arrest, when no
opportunity to secure a warrant existed in advance of the arrest, is
considerably weaker. Evidence reasonably seized under these circum-
stances does not contravene basic social values to the extent necessary
to justify exclusion.
For example, requiring a warrant to be secured after a valid arrest
87 This analysis depends, of course, upon a broad and expansive interpretation of
Warden v. Hayden. There is no assurance or even indication that the Court would accept
such an interpretation. There is language In that case that indicates It might have limited
application. The Court was very intent upon pointing out that the search could well have
been made for weapons and not for evidence. Secondly the search was largely completed
before the suspect was arrested. Whether it would be applied to searches that are conducted
after the arrest is completed is a matter for speculation. However, it must be noted that
the Court did sanction an extremely thorough search into areas where the defendant
could not possibly have been hiding, and it did so without the slightest hint that the
police should first have looked for the suspect. After they had him in custody the police
could have secured a warrant to look in the washing machine, under the mattress and In
the tank of the household toilet. The Court, however, did not require a warrant.
If this interpretation of "hot pursuit" is not accepted by the courts, it would seem that,
even if the police have no time for judicial authorization prior to the time of the arrest,
after the arrest is made they must secure a warrant validly to search the structure. In
situations where the facts prohibited the officers from leaving the scene to secure a
warrant, their conduct would probably be guided by the concept of reasonableness. The
emergency of the situation would gauge the propriety of their search.
88 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55,
238 N.E2d 307 (1968), vacated sub nom., Morales v. New York, 396 US. 102 (1969).
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adds no great protection to the privacy of the accused. His premises
have already been invaded by the arresting officers. His person and the
surrounding area have been subjected to a lawful search.80 If the arrest
is lawful, very likely there is "probable cause" sufficient to secure a
warrant authorizing a search of the entire premises. Securing this
warrant is only a matter of time and formality. At this point the
privacy of the accused is going to be open to governmental intrusion.
The warrant gives no real protection.00 It is when the evidence is
potentially ambiguous that judicial evaluation and authorization for
intrusion has its greatest meaning. When the police have the time
before their intrusion to submit their information to judicial evalua-
tion, avoidance of the process is inexcusable. But once there has been a
legal arrest under emergency circumstances, there is no longer any
substantial likelihood of probable cause questions upon which reason-
able minds would differ. Furthermore, the policy of encouraging resort
to the warrant process as a protection of individual liberty is served by
requiring the police to secure warrants when they have time before the
arrest. Little additional meaningful encouragement is added by requir-
ing the police, after making a valid arrest when time did not permit
securing a warrant, to stop and perform a time-consuming ritual of
marginal social value.
No one would contest the proposition that when a legal arrest is
made the officers should be entitled to search the suspect and the area
within immediate access. Officers must be careful, however, not to go
beyond the limits established by Chimel. In a particular case the limit
is perhaps impossible to ascertain. If society, as represented by the police,
has unjustifiably neglected to get prior judicial authorization, it cannot
complain if the vague boundary of permissible searches is crossed and
the use of the evidence so seized is lost. However, if circumstances
prohibit securing a warrant prior to arrest and if for the officer's protec-
tion some search must be made, it is unfair to make the officer accu-
89 This is not a restatement of the dissent in Chimel. There it was asserted that, even
though time permitted, the securing of a warrant should be excused because the invasion
was justified due to the admitted right to arrest and search. No such assertion Is made here.
If the police have time in advance to secure a warrant they cannot assert the right to
make a broad search.
00 The above argument is equally applicable to searches of the premises hours or even
days after the arrest therein. The securing of the warrant would be a mere "formality."
Yet in such a situation the "formality" would seem to be required. See Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States ex rel. Nickens v. LaVallee, 391 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1968). See also State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966) (warrant demanded for
seizure of an object already discovered by a valid search).
1971]
HeinOnline  -- 5 Ga. L. Rev.  291 1970-1971
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
rately judge the limits of this self-protection under the pain of losing
valuable evidence. Similarly, in the situation that makes securing a war-
rant after the arrest difficult, the police will be called upon to make an
on-the-spot evaluation of whether sufficient emergency exists legally to
excuse the securing of a warrant. If they make the search and their
evaluation of the emergency is later deemed wrong, the evidence is
lost. If when time permitted, the police failed to secure a warrant in
advance of their initial intrusion, they have no one to blame for this
loss but themselves. However, if they had no time to secure a warrant
before the arrest, they are not responsible for their dilemma. It is unfair
to force them to make an accurate legal evaluation where lawyers and
judges probably could not agree. The police should not be made victims
of a dilemma not of their own making.
Therefore, this area should be governed by the proposed Chimel-
Hayden test. When there is no opportunity to secure a warrant in
advance of the initial intrusion, a reasonable search of the premises
should be permissible. This is the Hayden branch of the test. However,
when there is time to secure a search warrant in advance of police
action, Hayden would not apply. The search would be limited by
Chimel's doctrine of "person and area within his reach."
This would seem to be a fair rule. It goes great lengths to insure that,
whenever practicable, the magistrate is placed between the police and
the people. It is a rule that has relative ease of application. Of course,
what constitutes sufficient time to secure a warrant is a question of de-
gree that is not subject to exact answers. However, this concept is
certainly no more vague than "incident," "probable cause" and numer-
ous other terms the police have learned to live with if not relish. In
many ways it is perhaps a concept the police can understand and
appreciate. "If you have time, get a warrant," is not a difficult command
to obey. At the same time the rule does not make a fetish out of the
warrant process. Once the policeman validly initiates his action he can
move freely without needless sidetrips to the courthouse, and, while
acting validly, he will be faced with a minimum of dilemmas not of
his own construction.
CONCLUSION
As should be apparent by now, the application of the fourth amend-
ment to arrests, searches and seizures is a forest of confusion. Much of
this maze is the result of unclear analysis of the relationship between
the fourth amendment's warrant and reasonableness clauses. For in-
stance, when the police desire to search a place or seize a thing, the
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basic rule demands that they secure a warrant prior to their action.
However, if they desire to seize a person no warrant is required.
Confusing inconsistency likewise results from a lack of clear articula-
tion of the nature of probable cause. What is its source-common law
or the warrant dause? What is its character-constant or flexible?
The way from the thicket would seem to lie in the direction of a
reexamination of the importance of the warrant requirement and of
the term "probable cause" in the determination of fourth amendment
"reasonableness."
As a basic rule all searches and seizures, whether the object of the
invasion is person, place or thing, should require a warrant. The pri-
vacy and sanctity of the individual should be protected by the disinter-
ested magistrate and should not be unnecessarily subjected to the
unilateral whim of the police. Only if it can be shown that the
exigencies of the circumstances, such as, for instance, on-the-street
encounters, prohibited the police from resorting to judicial authoriza-
tion should this requirement of reasonableness be excused.
If because of the exigency, a warrant could not practically be secured,
the sole test of police action then should be one of "reasonableness."
The first and foremost requirement of "reasonableness" is cause. The
police cannot arrest without cause. They cannot search without cause.
Cause, however, demands something more than subjective motivation.
Cause must be measured by an external standard of objectivity. Other-
wise the police would be the sole judges of their intrusions. Though
all objective standards are by definition constant, this does not mean
that different amounts of information might not authorize varying
degrees of police reaction under differing circumstances. As the
"reasonable man" reacts differently according to the facts before him,
so the standard of cause needed for reasonable police action should vary
according to the circumstances faced by the police. Once their intrusion
is justified by emergency, the police may proceed within the limits of
reasonableness bounded by cause and the numerous other relevant
factors inherent in the term.
In summary, the first rule that should be satisfied is the warrant
requirement. All initial intrusions, searches, and seizures should demand
resort to the process. If that is impossible, the police must have cause
before they act. If this cause would reasonably warrant police action,
the police may proceed with search, seizure, or arrest. The particular
police action is to be measured by the raw concept of reasonableness
and the myriad of factors bound up in it. In this way, the fourth
amendments protections could be fairly and coherently applied.
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